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for statutory period. The issue is whether GD's possession was adverse.
CD offers XY to prove that W, under whom AB claims, said that he had
sold the land to GD. AB objects to this testimony. Decide the admis-
sibility, giving your reasoning and stating the rules of law applicable.
XII. T conveyed land to S in Alabama in 1863 and S executed his
promissory note to T in part payment. The note was for $10,000.00 in
these words: "Montgomery, Alabama, November 1, 1863. One day
after date, I promise to pay to T., Ten Thousand Dollars." Action is
brought on this note in 1867, and at the trial, S offers to prove that at
the time of the execution of the note, it was the agreement of the parties
that the words "'en Thousand Dollars" meant "Ten Thousand Dollars
in Confederate money.' T objects to this evidence. Decide the admis-
sibility, giving your reasons and stating the rule of law applicable.
XIII. An insolvent, AB, executed an assignment on October 17.
The books of AB show ftfteen entries by AB on the sixteenth, in each
case the entry showing payment made to AB by the respective persons,
upon whose accounts the entries were made, the result of the entries be-
ing to show that AB was indebted to the respective persons in a large
amount, whereas without those entries, the persons would be indebted to
AB. Defendant introduces assignor who testified that the entries were
not based on any actual transaction of the date of the entries. Defendant
then asked the assignor for an explanation of the entries, and the as-
signor gave an explanation, which, if true, was sufficient in law to justify
making the entries. Defendant offered XY to testify (1) that the ex-
planation was untrue, (2) that assignor was not worthy of belief upon
general reputation. But the Court refused to admit this evidence.
Should it have been admitted? Answer the question, giving your reason-
ing and stating the rule applicable.
XIV. Detail in order the stages in the procedure necessary to have
a private writing considered as evidence by a jury.
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ABSTRACTS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE KEN-
TUCKY COURT OF APPEALS
XANSFIDLD V. COMMONWEALTH.
Decided March 11, 1915. Appeal from Barren Circuit Court.
,Change of Venue. The matter of granting a change of venue is largely
in the discretion of the trial court, and unless it affirmatively appears
that this discretion has been abused, the ruling of the trial court will not
be interfered with.
Articles in newspapers published at the place where the crime was
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committed, denouncing the crime and demanding that speedy justice
be administered, although admissible on the hearing of a motion for a
change of venue, are not in themselves cause for the removal. There
must be other and independent testimony that the condition of public
sentiment in the county is such that the accused cannot have a fair trial.
Experimental Evidence.-On the trial of the accused for murder,
where his defense was that a pistol in the hands of the deceased was
discharged while he was striking the accused over the head with the butt
of it, thereby causing his death, and the pistol could not be produced on
the trial, it was competent for the Commonwealth to permit witnesses to
testify and demonstrate before the jury that a pistol such as the deceased
had could not be discharged unless the trigger was pulled and the safety
device pressed at the same time, after circumstantial evidence that the
deceased had such pistol when killed.
Misconduct of Juror.-A motion for a new trial on the ground that
a juror had expressed sentiments of hostility toward the accused before his
selection as a juror, should not be sustained unless the evidence is clear
and convincing that the juror made the statements attributed to him,
and in matters like this the ruling of the trial court is entitled to great
weight.
It was not misconduct on the part of the officer in charge of the
jury to permit a son of one of the jurors, who was under arrest to talk
to his father in the presence of the officer and the jury in regard to the
matter for which he had been arrested. Nor was it misconduct on the
part of the officer to permit the jury to go to a moving-picture show when
it appeared that no person talked with the jury about the case on trial
while they were at the show.
DUNN V. BLUE GRASS REALTY COMPANY.
Decided March 9, 1915. Appeal from Madison Circuit Court.
New Trial-When Will Be Granted.-Where the damages can be
measured, and the verdict of the jury is such as to demonstrate that the
proof was disregarded, and the law of the case as embodied in the in-
struction, was disobeyed, a new trial will be granted.
Judgment-Must Follow and Conform to Verdict.-A judgment
must follow and conform to the verdict, not only as to the amount of the
recovery, but also as to the nature and measure of relief and as to the
parties; and, it cannot go beyond the verdict in settling the rights of the
parties or admeasuring the recovery, or declaring or foreclosing liens,
except that in cases where the evidence would have authorized the court
to direct a verdict, it may, in rendering judgment, go further than the
verdict in adjusting the equities of the parties.
Although the general rule is, that where the amount is not actually
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in issue, a simple finding for the plaintiff, or the defendant, is usually
sufficient without specifying any particular sum, this rule does not apply
where the jury goes further and finds for the plaintiff a specific erroneous
-uuL in damages.
Where a jury specifies the amount of its finding, which is erroneous
under the instructions, the court is not justified in entering a judgment
for a different amount, since, in that case, the judgment would not con-
form to the verdict, but would depart from it. In such a case all the
court can do is to set aside the verdict as being contrary to the law of the
case as contained in the instructions.
Newly Discovered Evidence.-A new trial will not be granted upon
the sole ground of the discovery, after verdict, of parol testimony con-
cerning a point litigated, or a fact known to the party; but, when the
newly discovered evidence is of such a permanent and unerring character
as to preponderate greatly, or have a decisive influence upon the verdict
to be overturned by it, a new trial will be granted.
0
KNIGHTS OF MACCABEES OF THE WORLD V. SHIELDS.
Decided January 28, 1915. Appeal from Nelson Circuit Court.
Counsel should never attempt to get before the jury matters beyond
the record having no real bearing upon the case, merely to prejudice the
jury; and while one act of such impropriety may be overlooked, if the
court properly admonishes the jury not to regard it, should not be over-
looked where he persistently attempts to inflame the jurors' minds.
Where a lawyer, in argument to the jury, makes statements not supported
by the record, the trial judge should, without waiting for objections,
promptly reprimand the offending counsel, charge the jury to disregard
his statements, and if the comments are of such prejudicial nature as
improperly to influence the jury, he should set aside any verdict rendered
in favor of such counsel. In a suit to recover on a policy against a fra-
ternal insurance company, after admitting that it was a fraternal insur-
ance company and predicating its case upon that idea, it was unfair for
counsel to argue to the contrary. Argument by appellee's counsel that
appellant, a fraternal insurance company, "had millions, with its home in
Michigan, and referring to appellee as a weeping widow, and in need of
money, and that the company took money that would buy bread for her
and the little ones and used it to pay officer's salaries, and that if the
jury denied such cry and wail of the widow as had been heard for almost
three years, they would turn her back upon her husband's grave, and her
children out crying for bread," precluded appellant from having a fair
trial, and after such argument, counsel did not make amends by telling
the jury to "put the children out of sight, forget them."
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CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY V. DWYER'S AD-
MINISTRATRIX.
Decided January 29, 1915. Appeal from Boyd Circuit Court.
Widow Only Dependant-Entitled to Entire Amount Recovered.-
In an action brought by the personal representative, under the "Employ-
ers' Liability Act," to recover damages of a railroad company for the
death of an employe, caused by the negligence of the railroad company,
if the widow of the decedent is the only dependent beneficiary under the
act, she will be entitled to take all the damages that may be recovered.
The damages recoverable under the "Employers' Liability Act" by or for
a deceased employe's widow as sole beneficiary, is such a sum as will
fairly and reasonably compensate her for the pecuniary loss, if any, sus-
tained by her on account of his death; and an instruction which, as in
this case, so told the jury, and also told them that, in fixing the amount,
they were authorized to take into consideration the decedent's age, habits,
business ability, earning capacity and the probable duration of his life,
as well as the pecuniary loss, if any, the widow sustained by being de-
prived of such support and maintenance, if any, as the evidence may
have shown she would have derived from the decedent, had he lived; but
that the damages allowed should be confined to the period of the widow's
dependency and not exceed the aggregate sum of the decedent's probable
earnings during his expectancy of life, nor more than the sum sued for in
the petition, properly advised them of the law as to the measure of dam-
ages in the meaning of the act. A verdict awarding an employe's widow
$16,000.00 damages for his death, will not be regarded excessive, where
it is made to appear from the evidence that he was a sober, industrious
man, forty-five years of age; that his earnings as a locomotive engineer
had averaged $160.00 per month and his life expectancy was 24.46 years,
that of the widow practically the same; and the amount of the verdict
it but little more than one-third of the aggregate sum of his probable
earnings during life expectancy.
The Kentucky Intercollegiate debating contest was held in State
University Chapel on the 12th of March, between State University and
Georgetown College. The question for debate was: Resolved: "That the
State of Kentucky should adopt the unicameral system of government."
State 'University upheld the affirmative side and won a unanimous
decision. S. S. Combs and J. N. Farmer, two junior law students were
members of the Varsity team.
